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Abstract
We show that contrary to traditional incidence analysis, the burden of sin
taxes does not necessarily fall most heavily on individuals with the highest level
of consumption. We also derive a condition for cases where sin taxes improve
individual welfare. We further argue that taxes on goods such as unhealthy food
can be progressive when consumers have time-inconsistent preferences.
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1 Introduction
We analyze the incidence of taxes on goods whose current consumption causes utility
costs (for example negative health e¤ects) in the future. When consumers have time-
inconsistent preferences, they consume too much of such goods. Using sin taxesto
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correct distortions in the consumption of harmful goods has also been considered in
ODonoghue and Rabin (2003; 2006).
In addition to the monetary cost of taxation, sin taxes a¤ect individual utility due
to the corrective nature of the tax when preferences are time-inconsistent. In order
to take this positive e¤ect into account, traditional incidence measures need to be
modied. Gruber and Köszegi (2004) have suggested the use of such a utility based
incidence measure in the case of taxes on addictive goods such as cigarettes1. Because
of the complexity of the problem analyzed in their paper, Gruber and Köszegi (2004)
are restricted to consider a particular form of the periodic utility function (quadratic
utility). By restricting attention to the simpler case of goods that are harmful but not
addictive, we can consider more general utility functions. We are also able to derive
an explicit condition for the case where sin taxes improve an individuals welfare.
Contrary to traditional incidence analysis, the burden of sin taxes does not nec-
essarily fall most heavily on individuals with the highest level of consumption: when
consumption is high, the tax does imply a higher monetary cost, but also a higher
utility benet from self-control. It may even be the case that those with the highest
level of consumption are hurt least by (or benet the most from) the tax. Further, we
show that the welfare e¤ect of sin taxes depends importantly on the elasticity of de-
mand, as well as on the extent of self-control problems and the marginal harm caused
by consumption. To the extent that individuals with low income have more elastic
demand than individuals with higher income, it is possible that taxes on goods such as
unhealthy food are progressive, in the sense that their overall utility cost (benet) is
lowest (highest) for poor individuals. This is contrary to the common counter-argument
against heavy VAT rates on necessities, which are usually regarded as regressive.
1For addictive goods, consumption today not only causes harm tomorrow, but also increases the
marginal benet of future consumption.
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2 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and over-consumption
of harmful goods
We consider a model where consumers use quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997),
using a set-up that is similar to ODonoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006). Lifetime utility
of an individual is given by
Ut = (ut; :::; uT ) = ut + 
TX
s=t+1
s tus; (1)
where ;  2 (0; 1) and ut is the periodic utility function. Individuals derive utility
from a composite good (z), which can be interpreted as leisure, and another good (x)
which is harmful in the sense that it yields positive utility in the short-run, but has
some negative e¤ects in the long-run. Specically, we assume that periodic utility is
given by
ut (xt; xt 1; zt) = v(xt)  h (xt 1) + zt (2)
where  is the marginal utility of income. The function v is increasing and concave.
The harm function h is increasing and it can in principle be either concave or convex,
as long as v00   h00 < 0. In our view the most likely case is the one where h00 > 0:
We assume that there is no borrowing or lending. In each period, consumers then
maximize ut = v(xt) h (xt)+zt subject to a per-period budget constraint qxt+zt 
1, where we have normalized the wage and the consumersxed time endowment to 1,
and q denotes the consumer price of good x. The demand for good x therefore satises2
v0(x)  h0 (x)  q = 0.
On the other hand, the levels of consumption that would maximize lifetime utility
are those that maximize ut = v (xt)  h (xt) + zt. The optimal level of consumption
2We have dropped the time index t, since with our specication consumption is constant accross
periods.
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therefore satises v0(x)   h0 (x)   q = 0: because of quasi-hyperbolic discounting
( < 1), the equilibrium level of consumption of the harmful good (x) is higher than
the level that would maximize long-run welfare of the individual himself (x):
3 Incidence of sin taxes
As market-based mechanisms for correcting the distortion caused by time-inconsistent
preferences are likely to be ine¤ective (see Köszegi (2005)), the government can con-
sider imposing a tax on the consumption of the harmful good. To the extent that
laws on commodity taxation cannot be changed each period, this will provide an ef-
fective commitment-device for consumers. Optimal sin taxes have been analyzed in
ODonoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006).
We do not analyze the question of optimal sin taxes here, but simply examine
the factors a¤ecting their incidence. As in Gruber and Köszegi (2004), we measure
incidence by the overall impact of the tax on individual utility. We assume that the
tax comes into e¤ect starting from the period after the decision to impose the tax is
made. Therefore, each consumer evaluates the e¤ect of the tax according to his long-
run utility function (but taking into account that consumption decisions will be taken
to maximize utility each period and will therefore be distorted, as above). The e¤ect
of a price (or tax) increase on a consumers welfare (measured per period) is therefore
given by
du (x)
dq
=
@u (x)
@q
+
@u (x)
@x
@x
@q
: (3)
For time-consistent consumers, x = x and the e¤ect of the tax on utility is
given by Roys identity, du(x
)
dq
= @u(x
)
@q
=  x: However, to obtain a correct incidence
measure for the case where x > x, we need to consider the second term, @u(x
)
@x
@x
@q
: This
term is zero for time-consistent consumers but positive for time-inconsistent consumers,
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reecting the fact that the price increase helps such consumers to overcome a distortion
in consumption.
In order to analyze tax incidence in more detail, we note that the derivative in (3)
is given by
du (x)
dq
=  x + (v0(x)  h0 (x)  q)@x

@q
: (4)
Denoting the elasticity of demand for the harmful good by " = @x

@q
q
x ; the welfare
e¤ect of a tax increase can be written as
du (x)
dq
=  x

1  j"j (1  ) h
0 (x)
q

: (5)
Our main results follow from equation (5), which shows that the traditional inci-
dence measure is in our context multiplied by the term 1   j"j (1 )h0(x)
q
: Therefore,
if there are no self-control problems ( = 1) we obtain the traditional incidence mea-
sure. On the other hand, when  < 1, the tax has both monetary costs ( x) and
self-control benets (x j"j (1 )h0(x)
q
).
In traditional incidence analysis, the burden of taxation always falls most heavily on
individuals with the highest level of consumption. A key point to note here, however,
is that not only the monetary costs, but also the self-control benets of taxation are
in most cases monotonically increasing in the quantity consumed. This is always the
case for example when h00 (x)  0 and when the elasticity of demand is constant
or increasing in x. If self-control benets increase more rapidly than the monetary
costs, the burden of taxation falls least heavily on those with the highest level of
consumption. This is more likely to happen if self-control problems are extensive ( is
low), consumption causes a lot of harm (h0 is high), demand is highly elastic or when
future utility is discounted relatively little ( is high). In these cases, there is more to
be gained from better self-control.
5
Further, for some parameter values, it is possible that the gain from enhanced
self-control exceeds the monetary loss from the tax3. This is in stark contrast to
traditional incidence analysis, where tax incidence is always negative. Rearranging (5)
and using the individuals rst order condition, a price increase leads to an increase in
a consumers welfare if
j"j > v
0(x)  h0 (x)
(1  ) h0 (x) (6)
As discussed above, sin taxes can improve welfare only if demand for the harmful good
is elastic enough (that is, if (6) is satised) - only when demand is responsive enough to
price changes will taxation be an e¤ective self-control device. We can consider two sim-
ple special cases. When harm is proportional to initial enjoyment from consumption,
that is if h(x) = v (x) ; where  2 (0; 1), (6) simplies to j"j > 1 
(1 ) : The right hand
side of this inequality is greater than 1 and therefore j"j > 1 is a necessary (though not
always a su¢ cient) condition for the tax to be welfare-improving in this special case.
However, in the more realistic case where harm is proportional to consumption rather
than initial enjoyment ( h(x) = x), condition (6) becomes j"j > v0(x) 
(1 ) . j"j > 1 is
then no longer necessary for the tax to be benecial for welfare.
The above analysis has interesting implications for the discussion on whether taxes
on goods such as unhealthy food are regressive. By regressivity, we mean that the
overall utility cost (benet) of a tax, as measured by equation (3), is higher (lower) for
the poor than for the rich. We showed above that in the context of sin taxes, it is no
longer necessarily the case that individuals with the highest level of consumption bear
most of the tax burden. Therefore, in the present context, the traditional argument that
high taxes on necessities must be regressive because they occupy a higher proportion
of the budget of the poor simply has no bite.
Further, to the extent that demand is more elastic for the poor, the burden of sin
3See Gruber and Mullainathan (2005) for empirical evidence that higher cigarette taxation can
make smokers happier.
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taxes falls less heavily on the poor than on the rich.4 It can further be noted that the
observation that food is a necessity and therefore has a low income elasticity, in no
way precludes the possibility that the price elasticity may be high enough for (6) to be
satised. In particular, if we concentrate on the example of unhealthy food, this has a
natural and a very close substitute - namely healthy food - and therefore demand can
be expected to be rather elastic, and such substitution will only reinforce the benecial
e¤ects of the tax5. Further, the fact that the poor spend a larger share of their budget
on food only tends to make the price elasticity higher for them, as implied by the
Slutsky equation. Individuals with a low income may therefore be hurt less by - or
benet more from - sin taxes than the rich.
4 Conclusion
We have examined how traditional incidence measures have to be adapted in the case of
sin taxes. In particular, we have emphasized that sin taxes do not necessarily fall most
heavily on individuals with the highest level of consumption, since such individuals
have the most to gain from the corrective nature of the tax.
Further, we have shown that the welfare e¤ects of sin taxes depend importantly on
the elasticity of demand for the harmful good. We can therefore conclude that to the
extent that individuals with low income have more elastic demand than individuals
with higher income, it is possible that sin taxes are in fact progressive. It is interesting
to contrast this nding with a remark made by James Mirrlees, who has stated that "it
is not inevitable that taxes distort the economy, but if they are fair, then they almost
4If  and/or  vary across population groups, this has an e¤ect on incidence. In their analysis
of cigarette taxation, Gruber and Köszegi (2004) argue that the e¤ect on incidence of varying  is
relatively small, whereas there is no evidence on how  varies in the population. The exact magnitude
of the di¤erent e¤ects in our context is a matter for empirical study, and is beyond the scope of this
note.
5This is in contrast to the example of cigarettes, where substitution is at least in part likely to be
towards untaxed bads such as drugs, which serves to partially undermine the positive health e¤ects
of taxation.
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certainly do" (Mirrlees 2000, 2). If we make the usual interpretation that taxation that
hurts low income individuals the most is "unfair", sin taxes are in fact a case of taxes
that can be both fair and reduce distortions.
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